Philosophical Studies

, Volume 107, Issue 2, pp 109–128 | Cite as

In Defence of Burge's Thesis

  • Sarah Sawyer
Article

Abstract

Burge's thesis is the thesis that certain second-order self-ascriptionsare self-verifying in virtue of their self-referential form. The thesis hasrecently come under attack on the grounds that it does not yield a theory ofself-knowledge consistent with semantic externalism, and also on the groundsthat it is false. In this paper I defend Burge's thesis against both charges,in particular against the arguments of Bernecker, Gallois and Goldberg. Thealleged counterexamples they provide are merely apparent counterexamples, andthe thesis is adequate to its proper task. To think otherwise is simply tomisunderstand the thesis.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sarah Sawyer
    • 1
  1. 1.University of KansasLawrenceUSA

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