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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

, Volume 22, Issue 6, pp 505–517 | Cite as

A Meta-Ethical Critique of Care Ethics

  • Abraham Rudnick
Article

Abstract

A meta-ethical analysis demonstrates that care ethics is a grounded in a distinct mode of moral reasoning. This is comprised primarily of the rejection of principles such as impartiality, and the endorsement of emotional or moral virtues such as compassion, as well as the notion that the preservation of relations may override the interests of the individuals involved in them. The main conclusion of such a meta-ethical analysis is that such meta-ethical foundations of care ethics are not sound. Reasonable alternatives for care ethics may be its formulation as an additional principle within an established principlist framework, or the move to a dialogical ethics, where the good to be acted upon is not decided in advance but rather critically discussed and established within the encounter of the parties involved.

care ethics casuistry meta-ethics principlism relationism virtue theory 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Abraham Rudnick
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Behavioral SciencesTel Aviv University School of MedicineTel AvivIsrael

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