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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 23–43 | Cite as

Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak

  • Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
Article

Abstract

What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental value is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value.

auxiliary value extrinsic value final value instrumentality intrinsic value Korsgaard Kagan trope usefulness value bearer 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLund UniversityLundSweden

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