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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 107, Issue 1, pp 69–86 | Cite as

A Deflationist Approach to Indeterminacy and Vagueness

  • Ken Akiba
Article

Abstract

Deflationists cannot make sense ofthe notion of referential indeterminacybecause they deny the existence of substantivereference. One way for them to make sense ofthe objective existence of linguisticindeterminacy is by embracing theworldly (or objectual) view ofindeterminacy, the view that indeterminacyexists not in reference relations but in the(non-linguistic) world itself. On this view,the entire world is divided into precisified worlds, just as it is dividedinto temporal slices and (arguably) alethicpossible worlds. Supervaluationism proves tobe neutral with respect to the debate betweenthe worldly view and the referential view ofindeterminacy.

Keywords

Worldly View Reference Relation Entire World Objective Existence Temporal Slice 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ken Akiba
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Missouri-ColumbiaColumbiaUSA

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