Synthese

, Volume 129, Issue 3, pp 371–380 | Cite as

Why The Pessimistic Induction Is A Fallacy

  • Peter J. Lewis
Article

Abstract

Putnam and Laudan separately argue that the falsity of past scientific theories gives us reason to doubt the truth of current theories. Their arguments have been highly influential, and have generated a significant literature over the past couple of decades. Most of this literature attempts to defend scientific realism by attacking the historical evidence on which the premises of the relevant argument are based. However, I argue that both Putnam's and Laudan's arguments are fallacious, and hence attacking their premises is unnecessary. The paper concludes with a discussion of the further historical evidence that would be required if the pessimistic induction is to present a serious threat to scientific realism.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter J. Lewis
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of MiamiCoral GablesU.S.A.

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