In a series of experiments we show that people learn to playthe efficient outcome in an open-ended rent-seeking game. Thisresult persists despite quite different experimentenvironments and designs, like different propensities ofcompetition, group sizes etc., and is interpretable as aresolution of the so-called Tullock paradox which states thatreal-world rent-seeking expenditures are much lower than whatthe standard rent-seeking model predicts.
KeywordsGroup Size Public Finance Efficient Outcome
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