Public Choice

, Volume 110, Issue 1–2, pp 67–78 | Cite as

Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment

  • Carsten Vogt
  • Joachim Weimann
  • Chun-Lei Yang

Abstract

In a series of experiments we show that people learn to playthe efficient outcome in an open-ended rent-seeking game. Thisresult persists despite quite different experimentenvironments and designs, like different propensities ofcompetition, group sizes etc., and is interpretable as aresolution of the so-called Tullock paradox which states thatreal-world rent-seeking expenditures are much lower than whatthe standard rent-seeking model predicts.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carsten Vogt
    • 1
  • Joachim Weimann
    • 1
  • Chun-Lei Yang
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of Economics and ManagementOtto-von-Guericke Universität MagdeburgMagdeburgGermany
  2. 2.Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy Academia SinicaNankang TaipeiTaiwan

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