Public Choice

, Volume 110, Issue 1–2, pp 99–119 | Cite as

Does Unemployment Insurance Displace Familial Assistance?

  • Robert F. Schoeni


The objective of this study is to examine the extent to whichbenefits received from the Unemployment Insurance Programdisplace assistance that the unemployed receive from theirextended family. Using data from a supplement to the PanelStudy of Income Dynamics, it is found that the unemployedreceive private support and that these private networks arefairly pervasive; twenty-nine percent of those receivingUnemployment Insurance benefits also receive cash transfersfrom their family or friends. Moreover, it is found thatunemployment benefits displace familial support by as much as24–40 cents per dollar.


Public Finance Unemployment Insurance Insurance Benefit Income Dynamics Familial Support 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert F. Schoeni
    • 1
  1. 1.RANDSanta MonicaU.S.A

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