Public Choice

, Volume 109, Issue 1–2, pp 119–139 | Cite as

What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?

  • Jeffrey Milyo


Much empirical work on Congressional elections implicitly assumesthat candidates are vote-maximizers; this may be a fairassumption for challengers, but it is not a good description ofincumbent behavior. I present a general intertemporal utilitymaximizing model of candidate behavior, which includes vote-maximization as a special case. I then demonstrate that thesemodels have important consequences for both the design andinterpretation of empirical work.


Public Finance Good Description Empirical Work Congressional Election Candidate Behavior 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jeffrey Milyo
    • 1
  1. 1.Harris SchoolUniversity of ChicagoChicagoU.S.A

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