Studia Logica

, Volume 68, Issue 1, pp 69–87 | Cite as

Theories of Truth Which Have No Standard Models

  • Hannes Leitgeb

Abstract

This papers deals with the class of axiomatic theories of truth for semantically closed languages, where the theories do not allow for standard models; i.e., those theories cannot be interpreted as referring to the natural number codes of sentences only (for an overview of axiomatic theories of truth in general, see Halbach[6]). We are going to give new proofs for two well-known results in this area, and we also prove a new theorem on the nonstandardness of a certain theory of truth. The results indicate that the proof strategies for all the theorems on the nonstandardness of such theories are "essentially" of the same kind of structure.

axiomatic theories of truth semantically closed languages nonstandard models omega-logic McGee's omega-inconsistency result 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hannes Leitgeb
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of SalzburgAustria

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