Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 12, Issue 3, pp 193–215 | Cite as

On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy

  • Roger D. Congleton


In practice one rarely observes pure forms of dictatorship that lack a council, or pure forms of parliament that lack an executive. Generally government policies emerge from organizations that combine an executive branch of government, “the king,” with a cabinet or parliamentary branch, “the council.” This paper provides an explanation for this regularity, and also provides an evolutionary model of the emergence of democracy that does not require a revolution. The analysis demonstrates that the bipolar “king and council” constitutional template has a number of properties that gives it great practical efficiency as a method of information processing and as a very flexible institutional arrangement for making collective decisions.


Information Processing Evolutionary Model Government Policy Pure Form Institutional Arrangement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roger D. Congleton
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Study of Public ChoiceGeorge Mason UniversityUSA

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