With existing technology, it is already possible for personal agents to schedule meetings for their users, to write the small print of an agreement, and for agents to search the Internet for the cheapest price. But serious negotiation cranks the difficulty of the problem up several notches. In this paper, we review what game theory has to offer in the light of experience gained in programming automated agents within the ADEPT (Advance Decision Environment for Process Tasks) project, which is currently being used by British Telecom for some purposes.
KeywordsGame Theory Business Process Management Bargaining Model Nash Bargaining Solution Game Theoretic Model
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