Minds and Machines

, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 95–99

In Computation, Parallel is Nothing, Physical Everything

  • Selmer Bringsjord
Article

Abstract

Andrew Boucher (1997) argues that ``parallel computation is fundamentally different from sequential computation'' (p. 543), and that this fact provides reason to be skeptical about whether AI can produce a genuinely intelligent machine. But parallelism, as I prove herein, is irrelevant. What Boucher has inadvertently glimpsed is one small part of a mathematical tapestry portraying the simple but undeniable fact that physical computation can be fundamentally different from ordinary, ``textbook'' computation (whether parallel or sequential). This tapestry does indeed immediately imply that human cognition may be uncomputable.

artificial intelligence parallel computation simulation proofs Turing machines uncomputable functions 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Selmer Bringsjord
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science, Department of Computer ScienceRensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)TroyUSA

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