Erkenntnis

, Volume 54, Issue 3, pp 321–344

Contents Just Are In The Head

  • Amir Horowitz
Article

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to show that semanticexternalism – the thesis that contents are notdetermined by ``individualistic'' features of mentalstates – is mistaken. Externalist thinking, it isargued, rests on two mistaken assumptions: theassumption that if there is an externalist wayof describing a situation the situation exemplifiesexternalism, and the assumption that cases in which adifference in the environment of an intentional stateentails a difference in the state's intentional objectare cases in which environmental factors determine thestate's content. Exposing these mistakes leads to seethat the conditions that are required for thetruth of externalism are inconsistent.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amir Horowitz
    • 1
  1. 1.CambridgeU.S.A.

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