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Biology and Philosophy

, Volume 16, Issue 3, pp 339–356 | Cite as

A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture For Moral Reasoning

  • John Bolender
Article

Abstract

The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tieredarchitecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both ofspecialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automaticallyand effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose,cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in thelight of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrastedwith rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmidesand Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued thata two-tiered architecture is more plausible.

ambivalence attitude cognitive architecture cognitively penetrable inclusive fitness informationally encapsulated mental faculty module moral intuition moral judgment repression strength of attitude teleological 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Bolender
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of PhilosophyMiddle East Technical UniversityAnkaraTurkey

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