Philosophical Studies

, Volume 105, Issue 3, pp 237–250 | Cite as

A New Solution to Moore's Paradox

  • Anthony S. Gillies


Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddnessagainst the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions tothe problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But``consistency'' is a theory-laden concept, having different contours indifferent semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriateonly if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning withtruth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate whenit comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory whichaccounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals(Update Semantics) buys us a solution to Moore's paradox as a corollary.It turns out that Moorean propositions, when looked at through the lenseof an appropriate semantic theory, are inconsistent after all.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anthony S. Gillies
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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