Philosophical Studies

, Volume 104, Issue 3, pp 269–290 | Cite as

Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects

  • Kris McDaniel


I argue that a solution to puzzles concerning the relationship ofobjects and their properties – a version of the `bundle' theory ofparticulars according to which ordinary objects are mereologicalfusions of monadic and relational tropes – is also a solution topuzzles of material constitution involving the allegedco-location of material objects. Additionally, two argumentsthat have played a prominent role in shaping the current debate,Mark Heller's argument for Four Dimensionalism and Peter vanInwagen's argument against Mereological Universalism, are shownto be unsound given this version of the bundle theory.


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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kris McDaniel
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MassachusettsAmherst

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