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Journal of Management & Governance

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 29–47 | Cite as

Governance Structures, Coordination Mechanisms and Cognitive Models

  • Anna Grandori
Article

Abstract

This paper criticizes the current prevailing ways ofmodelling governance alternatives, and advocates theopportunity and feasibility of a reconceptualizationof governance forms as mixes or configurations ofsimpler and potentially disentangleablecomponents. These components are constituted by abundle of property rights and by a set of coordinationmechanisms. The paper draws on a previous effort atintegrating economic, organizational and sociologicaltheories of governance in a cognitive perspective(Grandori 1995a) and explicitates how some cognitivefoundations of organization theory can be revised tosustain a more fine-grained view of governance. Theimplications for organization design are illustratedin the final section through the solution of someempirical design problems, as well as through areinterpretation of known hybrid arrangements.

Keywords

Collective Action Governance Structure Cognitive Model Governance System Governance Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anna Grandori
    • 1
  1. 1.Università di Modena and Università L. BocconiMilanoItaly

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