Experimental Economics

, Volume 1, Issue 3, pp 257–281 | Cite as

Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis

  • Gary E. Bolton


Bargaining and dilemma games have developed in experimental economics as fairly separate literatures. More than a few analysts are now persuaded that the patterns of behavior in these games are closely related, and considerable effort is being put into a search for models that bridge the gap between the two types of games. I focus on a handful of models that, when taken together, outline the conceptual issues, and provide a sense of the progress that has already been made.

bargaining dilemma games bounded rationality learning motivation 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gary E. Bolton
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management Science and Information SystemsPenn State UniversityUniversity ParkUSA

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