Journal of Economic Growth

, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 185–211

Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance

  • Christopher Clague
  • Philip Keefer
  • Stephen Knack
  • Mancur Olson

DOI: 10.1023/A:1009854405184

Cite this article as:
Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S. et al. Journal of Economic Growth (1999) 4: 185. doi:10.1023/A:1009854405184


We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called “contract-intensive money” or CIM, is based on citizens’ decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.

contract enforcement property rights governance economic growth 

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher Clague
    • 1
  • Philip Keefer
    • 2
  • Stephen Knack
    • 3
  • Mancur Olson
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSan Diego State UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Development Research GroupWorld BankUSA
  3. 3.IRISUniversity of MarylandUSA
  4. 4.IRIS and Department of EconomicsUniversity of Maryland atCollege Park

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