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Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 27–39 | Cite as

The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View

  • Charles B. Blankart
Article

Abstract

Government centralization is not a law of nature. It can be explained on the one hand by the endeavor of locally elected representatives of national assemblies to form tax and expenditure cartels, on the other hand by the constitutional power of the federal government to take over state tax legislation and to act as a cartel enforcer. A case study provides empirical evidence and moreover shows that such cartels generate a higher tax level and perform badly in interregional equalization of per capita income. The relevance of constitutional power for explaining centralization seems to be confirmed in various countries.

fiscal federalism constitutional economics 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles B. Blankart
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsHumboldt-University of BerlinBerlinGermany

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