European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 13–50 | Cite as

Destructive Competition or Competition Destroyed? Regulatory Theory and the History of Irish Road Transportation Legislation

  • Keith Jakee
  • Leonie Allen
Article

Abstract

The principal aim of our study is to contribute to the debate over whether regulation is enacted in the interest of consumers, producers, political agents, or some combination of these. We examine the legislative debates and subsequent regulatory bills surrounding road transportation regulation in Ireland in light of the three dominant theories which purport to explain the existence of regulation: the public interest theory and the so-called Chicago and Virginia theories. A unique feature of our study is an attempt to integrate specific rhetorical concepts used in the public policy debates into the theoretical analysis of regulation. One noteworthy conclusion of our study is that theories of economic processes affect the shaping and results of public policy.

Regulatory theories Ireland's road and rail transportation regulation economic theory and political transfers 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Keith Jakee
    • 1
    • 2
  • Leonie Allen
    • 3
  1. 1.Visiting Research ScholarCity University of StockholmUK
  2. 2.Lecturer, Department of EconomicsMonash UniversityClaytonAustralia
  3. 3.Research Associate, Department of EconomicsUniversity of LimerickLimerickIreland

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