Journal of Logic, Language and Information

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 143–163 | Cite as

Making Beliefs Coherentl. The Subtraction and Addition Strategies.

  • Erick J. Olsson
Article

Abstract

The notion of epistemic coherence is interpreted as involving not only consistency but also stability. The problem how to consolidate a belief system, i.e., revise it so that it becomes coherent, is studied axiomatically as well as in terms of set-theoretical constructions. Representation theorems are given for subtractive consolidation (where coherence is obtained by deleting beliefs) and additive consolidation (where coherence is obtained by adding beliefs).

Belief revision consolidation coherence stability 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Erick J. Olsson
    • 1
  1. 1.Fachgruppe PhilosophieUniversität KonstanzKonstanzGermany

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