Minds and Machines

, Volume 8, Issue 2, pp 237–249

Let's Dance! The Equivocation in Chalmers' Dancing Qualia Argument

  • Bram van Heuveln
  • Eric Dietrich
  • Michiharu Oshima
Article

Abstract

David Chalmers' dancing qualia argument is intended to show that phenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. The dancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstrate that holding an alternative position, such as the famous inverted spectrum argument, leads one to an implausible position about the relation between consciousness and cognition. In this paper, we argue that Chalmers' dancing qualia argument fails to establish the plausibility of qualia being organizational invariants. Even stronger, we will argue that the gap in the argument cannot be closed.

consciousness functionalism qualia 

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References

  1. Chalmers, D.J. (1994), A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition. Technical Report PNP Technical Report 94-03, Washington University.Google Scholar
  2. Chalmers, D.J. (1995), ‘The Puzzle of Conscious Experience’. Scientific American, 273: 80–86.Google Scholar
  3. Chalmers, D.J. (1996), The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bram van Heuveln
    • 1
  • Eric Dietrich
    • 1
  • Michiharu Oshima
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy and Computers and Cognitive Science, Department of PhilosopyBinghamton UniversityBinghamtonU.S.A.

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