Minds and Machines

, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp 57–101

Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution

  • Murat Aydede
Article

Abstract

Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not implementation models because, it is claimed, the way they obtain syntax and structure sensitivity is not "concatenative," hence "radically different" from the way classicists handle them. In this paper, I offer an analysis of what it is to physically satisfy/realize a formal system. In this context, I examine the minimal truth-conditions of LOT Hypothesis. From my analysis it will follow that concatenative realization of formal systems is irrelevant to LOTH since the very notion of LOT is indifferent to such an implementation level issue as concatenation. I will conclude that to the extent to which they can explain the law-like cognitive regularities, a certain class of connectionist models proposed as radical alternatives to the classical LOT paradigm will in fact turn out to be LOT models, even though new and potentially very exciting ones.

Connectionism Language of Thought cognitive architecture formal system syntax computation implementation concatenation structure sensitivity thinking systematicity 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Murat Aydede
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of ChicagoChicagoU.S.A.

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