Marketing Letters

, Volume 10, Issue 3, pp 233–248 | Cite as

Bounded Rationality Modeling

  • Bertrand Munier
  • Reinhard Selten
  • D. Bouyssou
  • P. Bourgine
  • R. Day
  • N. Harvey
  • D. Hilton
  • M. J. Machina
  • Ph. Parker
  • J. Sterman
  • E. Weber
  • B. Wernerfelt
  • R. Wensley


This paper deals with bounded rationality as a way to describe behavior and focuses on the question of how to build such boundedly rational models. The first part is a discussion of the reasons why such models are needed and on the situations in which they can be regarded as more particularly useful. The second part examines three strategies of research towards bounded rationality modeling which have emerged in the last ten years and weights them. The concluding remarks offer a first link between the respective typologies of strategies and of situations and calls for additional experimental work by marketing scientists and economists together.

Decision-making consumer behavior procedural rationality choice functionals adaptive behavior 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bertrand Munier
    • 1
  • Reinhard Selten
    • 2
  • D. Bouyssou
    • 3
  • P. Bourgine
    • 4
  • R. Day
    • 5
  • N. Harvey
    • 6
  • D. Hilton
    • 7
  • M. J. Machina
    • 8
  • Ph. Parker
    • 9
  • J. Sterman
    • 10
  • E. Weber
    • 11
  • B. Wernerfelt
    • 10
  • R. Wensley
    • 11
  1. 1.GRID, Ecole Normale Supérieure de CachanFrance
  2. 2.University of BonnGermany
  3. 3.ESSECFrance
  4. 4.CREA, Ecole PolytechniqueFrance
  5. 5.University of Southern CaliforniaUSA
  6. 6.University College LondonUK
  7. 7.Université de Toulouse-IIFrance
  8. 8.University of California at San DiegoUSA
  10. 10.M.I.TUSA
  11. 11.Ohio State UniversityUSA

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