, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 97–104 | Cite as

Justification, Discovery, Reason & Argument

  • Larry Wright


In distinguishing justification from discovery, the logical empiricists hoped to avoid confusing causal matters with normative ones. Exaggerating the virtue of this distinction, however, has disguised from us important features of the concept of a reason as it functions in human practice. Surfacing those features gives some insight into reasoning and argument.

argument competence discovery explanation justification reasons understanding 


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  1. Russell, B.: 1959, The Problems of Philosophy, Galaxy, New York.Google Scholar
  2. Wright, L.: 1995, 'Argument and Deliberation', The Journal of Philosophy 92, 565-585.Google Scholar
  3. Wright, L.: 1999, 'Reasons and the Deductive Ideal', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, 197-206.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Larry Wright
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CaliforniaRiversideUSA

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