Abstract
There are distinct but legitimate notions of both personal justification and interpersonal justification. Interpersonal justification is definable in terms of personal justification. A connection is established between good argumentation and interpersonal justification.
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GOLDMAN, A.I. Argumentation and Interpersonal Justification. Argumentation 11, 155–164 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007786207614
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007786207614