Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed
- Cite this article as:
- Lupia, A. & Mccubbins, M.D. European Journal of Political Research (2000) 37: 291. doi:10.1023/A:1007068904236
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Modern democracy requires delegation. Oneproblem with delegation is that principals andagents often have conflicting interests. A secondproblem is that principals lack informationabout their agents. Many scholars conclude that theseproblems cause delegation to become abdication. Wereject this conclusion and introduce a theory ofdelegation that supports a different conclusion. Thetheory clarifies when interest conflicts andinformation problems do (and do not) turn delegationinto abdication. We conclude by arguing that remediesfor common delegation problems can be embedded in thedesign of electoral, legislative, and bureaucraticinstitutions. The culmination of our efforts is asimple, but general, statement about when citizens andlegislators can (and cannot) control their agents.