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Erkenntnis

, Volume 53, Issue 1–2, pp 267–283 | Cite as

A Reduction Of Doxastic Logic To Action Logic

  • Heinrich Wansing
Article

Keywords

Action Logic Doxastic Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heinrich Wansing
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of PhilosophyDresden University of TechnologyDresdenGermany

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