, Volume 52, Issue 3, pp 281–311 | Cite as

Anti-Realist Semantics

  • Wolfram Hinzen


I argue that the implementation of theDummettian program of an ``anti-realist'' semanticsrequires quite different conceptions of the technicalmeaning-theoretic terms used than those presupposed byDummett. Starting from obvious incoherences in anattempt to conceive truth conditions as assertibilityconditions, I argue that for anti-realist purposesnon-epistemic semantic notions are more usefully kept apart from epistemic ones rather than beingreduced to them. Embedding an anti-realist theory ofmeaning in Martin-Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory(ITT) takes care, however, of many notorious problemsthat have arisen in trying to specify suitableintuitionistic notions of semantic value,truth-conditions, and validity, taking into accountthe so-called ``defeasibility of evidence'' forassertions in empirical discourses.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wolfram Hinzen
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut Für PhilosophieUniversität RegensburgRegensburgGermany

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