, Volume 50, Issue 2–3, pp 353–385

Ddl Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents

  • Sten Lindström
  • Wlodek Rabinowicz


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sten Lindström
    • 1
  • Wlodek Rabinowicz
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and LinguisticsUmeå UniversityUmeåSweden
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyLund UniversityLundSweden

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