Theory and Decision

, Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 123–128

Believe in Pascal's Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You!

  • Alexander Tabarrok
Article

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REFERENCES

  1. Cowen, T. and J. High (1988), Time, Bounded Utility, and the St. Petersburg Paradox. Theory and Decision 25: 219–273.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Tabarrok
    • 1
  1. 1.Director of ResearchThe Independent InstituteOaklandUSA

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