, Volume 123, Issue 1, pp 1–34

Knowing The World By Knowing One's Mind

  • Sven Bernecker

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005239420827

Cite this article as:
Bernecker, S. Synthese (2000) 123: 1. doi:10.1023/A:1005239420827


This paper addresses the question whetherintrospection plus externalism about mental contentwarrant an a priori refutation of external-worldskepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestionis that if thought content is partly determined byaffairs in the environment and if we can havenon-empirical knowledge of our current thoughtcontents, we can, just by reflection, know about theworld around us – we can know that our environment ispopulated with content-determining entities. Afterexamining this type of transcendental argument anddiscussing various objections found in the literature,I argue that the notion of privileged self-knowledgeunderlying this argument presupposes that we canlearn, via introspection, that our so-called thoughtsare propositional attitudes rather than contentlessstates. If, however, externalism is correct andthought content consists in the systematic dependencyof internal states on relational properties, we cannotknow non-empirically whether or not we havepropositional attitudes. Self-knowledge (apropositional attitude) is consistent with us lackingthe ability to rule out, via introspection, thepossibility that we don't have any propositionalattitudes. Self-knowledge provides us with knowledgeof what is in our minds, but not that we haveminds. Hence, the combination of externalism with thedoctrine of privileged self-knowledge does not allowfor an a priori refutation of skepticism and istherefore unproblematic.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sven Bernecker
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MunichMunichGermany

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