Necessity, The A Priori, And The Standard Meter
- 56 Downloads
This article critically examines SaulKripke's (1972) argument for the separability ofnecessary truths from truths known a priori,focusing on his criticism of the standard meter casepresented by Wittgenstein (1968). It attempts to showthat Kripke's argument is unworkable on any of severalreadings. Wittgenstein's own broadly conventionalistaccount of necessary truth is then considered in thelight of the standard meter example.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Kripke, S.: 1972, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
- Wittgenstein, L.: 1968, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Macmillan, New York.Google Scholar
- Wittgenstein, L.: 1975, Philosophical Remarks,R. Rhees (ed.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
- Wittgenstein, L.: 1978, Philosophical Grammar, R. Rhees (ed.), A. Kenny (trans.), University of California Press, Berkeley.Google Scholar
- Wittgenstein, L.: 1983, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe (eds), G. E. M Anscombe (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar