Public Choice

, Volume 106, Issue 1–2, pp 157–181 | Cite as

Understanding the Clayton Act of 1914: An Analysis of the Interest Group Hypothesis

  • Carlos D. Ramírez
  • Christian Eigen-Zucchi


The trusts issue culminated in the passage of the Clayton Act in1914, which conventional wisdom holds was a response to theperceived ineffectiveness of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.Using ordered and multinomial logit analysis, we were able todetect economic interest variables that explain the senators'votes. The empirical findings strongly support the wealth transferhypothesis, and the regression results clearly show that senatorsresponded to interest groups. While we also found some support forthe ideological perspective, it is clear that there was much moreto the vote than the conventional story would suggest.


Public Finance Interest Group Regression Result Empirical Finding Economic Interest 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carlos D. Ramírez
    • 1
  • Christian Eigen-Zucchi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxU.S.A

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