Synthese

, Volume 118, Issue 1, pp 105–117 | Cite as

Towards a Theory of Reflexive Intentional Systems

  • LUKAS BÖÖK
Article

Abstract

(1) Intentional system: a system whose behaviour we may reliably predict via the intentional strategy, i.e., by interpreting its behaviour as a (more or less) rational consequence of its beliefs and desires. (2) Reflexive intentional system: a system that is able to interpret itself via the intentional strategy, and whose behaviour is, thus, influenced by an understanding of itself. All intentional systems behave in a meaningful way, but only reflexive intentional systems are aware of the meaning, Hence, only the latter are conscious of what they are doing.

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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

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  • LUKAS BÖÖK

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