Public Choice

, Volume 106, Issue 1–2, pp 1–22 | Cite as

On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees

  • George Bulkley
  • Gareth D. Myles
  • Bernard R. Pearson
Article

Abstract

The decision of a committee is determined jointly by the votingprocess it adopts and the composition of its membership. The paper analyses the process through which committee members emerge from the eligiblepopulation and traces the consequences of this for the decisions ofthe committee. It is shown that the equilibrium committee will becomposed of representatives from the extremes of the tastedistribution. These extremes balance each other and the committeereaches a moderate decision. However, this mutual negation by theextremes is a socially wasteful use of time. Data from the UK Houseof Lords is used to illustrate these results.

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References

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Bulkley
    • 1
  • Gareth D. Myles
    • 1
  • Bernard R. Pearson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ExeterExeterUnited Kingdom

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