Public Choice

, Volume 106, Issue 1–2, pp 53–76

Productivity Growth and the Political Economy of Social Security

  • Berthold U. Wigger
Article

Abstract

The present paper provides an analysis of unfunded social securityas the outcome of a public decision making process in an endogenousgrowth economy. It employs a model in which there is a non-monotonic relationship beween productivity growth and the scale ofpublic intergenerational redistribution. The paper shows thatalthough unfunded social security need not harm growth in general,it is likely to harm growth in a democracy. This effect isreinforced by population aging.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Berthold U. Wigger
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MannheimMannheimGermany

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