Synthese

, Volume 115, Issue 3, pp 333–354

Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument

  • LAURA WADDELL EKSTROM
Article
  • 99 Downloads

Abstract

The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • LAURA WADDELL EKSTROM

There are no affiliations available

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