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Public Choice

, Volume 92, Issue 1–2, pp 15–26 | Cite as

Donald Wittman's The myth of democratic failure

  • Charles K. Rowley
Article

Keywords

Public Finance Democratic Failure 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles K. Rowley
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfax
  2. 2.The Locke InstituteFairfaxUSA

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