Theory and Decision

, Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 139–157

Cycling with Rules of Thumb: An Experimental Test for a new form of Non-Transitive Behaviour

  • Chris Starmer
Article

Abstract

This paper tests a novel implication of the original version of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979): that choices may systematically violate transitivity. Some have interpreted this implication as a weakness, viewing it as an anomaly generated by the ‘editing phase’ of prospect theory which can be rendered redundant by an appropriate re-specification of the preference function. Although there is some existing evidence that transitivity fails descriptively, the particular form of non-transitivity implied by prospect theory is quite distinctive and hence presents an ideal opportunity to expose that theory to test. An experiment is reported which reveals strong evidence of the predicted intransitivity. It is argued that the existence of this new form of non-transitive behaviour presents a fresh theoretical challenge to those seeking descriptively adequate theories of choice behaviour, and a particular challenge to those who seek explanations within the conventional economic paradigm of utility maximisation.

Intransitivity Experimental economics Prospect theory 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chris Starmer
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Economic and Social StudiesUniversity of East AngliaNorwichUK Phone

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