Theory and Decision

, Volume 44, Issue 2, pp 173–198

On Preference and Freedom

  • Prasanta K. Pattanaik
  • Yongsheng Xu
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1004924211553

Cite this article as:
Pattanaik, P.K. & Xu, Y. Theory and Decision (1998) 44: 173. doi:10.1023/A:1004924211553

Abstract

We consider the role of preferences in the assessment of an agent's freedom, visualized as the opportunity for choice. After discussing several possible intuitive approaches to the problem, we explore an approach based on the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may possibly have. Using different sets of axioms, we characterize the rules for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom. We also show that certain axioms for ranking opportunity sets are incompatible.

Freedom Opportunity set Ranking Reasonable person's preferences 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Prasanta K. Pattanaik
    • 1
    • 2
  • Yongsheng Xu
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of CaliforniaRiversideU.S.A.
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of NottinghamNottinghamU.K.

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