Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 28, Issue 6, pp 549–558 | Cite as

Semantic Closure, Descriptions and Non-Triviality

  • Graham Priest
Article

Abstract

It is known that a semantically closed theory with description may well be trivial if the principles concerning denotation and descriptions are formulated in certain ways, even if the underlying logic is paraconsistent. This paper establishes the non-triviality of a semantically closed theory with a natural, but non-extensional, description operator.

denotation descriptions non-extensionality non-triviality paraconsistency semantic closure 

REFERENCES

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  4. Priest, G. (1998): The trivial object, andthe non-triviality of a semantically closed theory with descriptions, J. Appl. Non-Classical Logics 8: 171–83.Google Scholar
  5. Priest, G. (199+): Paraconsistent logic. In:D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd. edn, Kluwer Acad. Publ., Dordrecht, forthcoming.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Graham Priest
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentThe University of QueenslandBrisbaneAustralia

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