Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 27, Issue 6, pp 603–620

The Logic of Pragmatic Truth

  • Newton C. A. da Costa
  • Otávio Bueno
  • Steven French
Article

Abstract

The mathematical concept of pragmatic truth, first introduced in Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui (1986), has received in the last few years several applications in logic and the philosophy of science. In this paper, we study the logic of pragmatic truth, and show that there are important connections between this logic, modal logic and, in particular, Jaskowski's discussive logic. In order to do so, two systems are put forward so that the notions of pragmatic validity and pragmatic truth can be accommodated. One of the main results of this paper is that the logic of pragmatic truth is paraconsistent. The philosophical import of this result, which justifies the application of pragmatic truth to inconsistent settings, is also discussed.

Jaskowski's logic modal logic paraconsistent logic partial structures pragmatic truth quasi-truth 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Newton C. A. da Costa
    • 1
  • Otávio Bueno
    • 2
  • Steven French
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of São Paulo, São Paulo-SPBrazil (E-mail: Email
  2. 2.Division of History and Philosophy of Science, Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LeedsLeeds, LS2 9JTUK (E-mail: Email

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