Philosophical Studies

, Volume 90, Issue 1, pp 35–56 | Cite as

A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument

  • Torin Alter
Article

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

REFERENCES

  1. Bigelow, J. and Pargetter, R. (1990): ‘Acquaintance with Qualia’, Theoria 61, 129–147.Google Scholar
  2. Brueckner, A. (1986): ‘Brains in a Vat’, Journal of Philosophy 83, 148–167.Google Scholar
  3. Burge, T. (1995): ‘Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice’, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.) Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Churchland, P. (1985): ‘Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States’, Journal of Philosophy 82, 8–28.Google Scholar
  5. Conee, E. (1994): ‘Phenomenal Knowledge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, 136–150.Google Scholar
  6. Dennett, D. (1991): Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little Brown and Company.Google Scholar
  7. Donnellan, K. (1970): ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions’, Synthese 21, 335–358.Google Scholar
  8. Donnellan, K. (1979): ‘The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators’, In P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.) Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, pp. 45–60. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  9. Evans, G. (1973): ‘The Causal Theory of Names’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. 47), 187–208.Google Scholar
  10. Frege, G. (1952): ‘On Concept and Object’, in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Black. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
  11. Hardin, C. (1988):Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow, Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
  12. Horgan, T. (1984): ‘Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 34, 147–152.Google Scholar
  13. Jackson, F. (1980): ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 127–136.Google Scholar
  14. Jackson, F. (1986): ‘What Mary Didn't Know’, The Journal of Philosophy 83, 291–195.Google Scholar
  15. Kaplan, D. (1989): ‘Afterthoughts’, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.) Themes from Kaplan, pp. 565–614. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  16. Kripke, S. (1980): ‘Naming and Necessity’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.) Semantics of Natural Language, pp. 253–355 and 763–769. Dordrecht: Reidel Rpt. as Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Lewis, D. (1983): Postscript to ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, pp. 13–32. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Lewis, D. (1990): ‘What Experience Teaches’, in Proceedings of the Russellian Society. Sydney: University of Sydney, 1988. Rpt. in W. Lycan (ed.) Mind and Cognition, pp. 499–518. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
  19. Loar, B. (1990): ‘Phenomenal States’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives IV: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, pp. 81–108. Atascadero: Ridgeview.Google Scholar
  20. Lycan, W. (1990): ‘What is the “Subjectivity” of the Mental?’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives IV: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, pp. 109–130. Atascadero: Ridgeview.Google Scholar
  21. Lycan, W. (1995): ‘A Limited Defense of Phenomenal Information’, in T. Metzinger (ed.) Conscious Experience, Tucson: University of Arizona Press.Google Scholar
  22. Nagel, T. (1974): ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, Philosophical Review 83, 435–550. Rpt. in his Mortal Questions, pp. 193–214. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  23. Nemirow, L. (1980): Review of Mortal Questions, by Thomas Nagel. Philosophical Review 89, 473–477.Google Scholar
  24. Nemirow, L. (1990): ‘Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance’, in W. Lycan (ed.) Mind and Cognition, pp. 490–499. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
  25. Pereboom, D. (1994): ‘Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 315–329.Google Scholar
  26. Russell, B. (1910–11): ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, Aristotelean Society Proceedings 11, 108–128.Google Scholar
  27. Sacks, O. (1995): ‘The Case of the Colorblind Painter’, in his An Anthropologist on Mars, pp. 3–41. New York: Knopf.Google Scholar
  28. Searle, J. (1992): The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  29. Tye, M. (1986): ‘The Subjectivity of Experience’, Mind 95, 1–17.Google Scholar
  30. Van Gulick, R. (1993): ‘Understanding the Phenomenal Mind’, in M. Davies and G. Humphries (eds.) Consciousness, pp. 137–154. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Torin Alter
    • 1
  1. 1.The University of AlabamaTuscaloosaU.S.A.

Personalised recommendations