Philosophical Studies

, Volume 91, Issue 2, pp 173–203 | Cite as

Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism

  • Nick Zangwill
Article

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nick Zangwill
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GlasgowGlasgowUK

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