Philosophical Studies

, Volume 89, Issue 1, pp 53–86

The Pleonasticity of Talk About Concepts

  • Alex Barber
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alex Barber
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyMcGill UniversityMontréalCanada

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