Philosophical Studies

, Volume 95, Issue 3, pp 277–310

Arithmaetical Platonism: Reliability and Judgement-Dependence

  • John Divers
  • Alexander Miller
Article

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Divers
    • 1
  • Alexander Miller
    • 2
  1. 1.School of PhilosophyUniversity of LeedsUK
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of BirminghamUK

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