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Corporate Financing in the New Member States: Firm-Level Evidence for Convergence and Divergence Trends

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Abstract

The paper presents results of an ongoing research project on corporate financing patterns in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since 1999. It addresses three broad issues. What are the specifics of corporate financing in CEE compared to countries in Western Europe? What country institutional and company factors may explain the similarities and differences between capital structures in the EU-15 and New Member States (NMS)? What are the major convergence and divergence trends in corporate financing patterns in an enlarged Europe? The study analyses the interactions between country institutional differences, firm ownership structures, other firm-specific characteristics and corporate financial patterns in both the EU-15 and NMS. It summarises the firm-level evidence and outlines several unresolved questions and major dimensions for further research.

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This research was supported by a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship within the Sixth European Community Framework Programme and the Austrian National Bank’s Jubiläumsfonds (Project No. 11782). We thank Dennis Mueller and Ajit Singh for helpful discussions.

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Peev, E., Yurtoglu, B. Corporate Financing in the New Member States: Firm-Level Evidence for Convergence and Divergence Trends. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 9, 337–381 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752908003376

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