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Legal Capital: A Navigation System for Corporate Law Scholarship

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References

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  4. The metaphor is taken from R.M. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1986) p. 239.

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  8. Second Council Directive of 13 December 1976, OJ 1977 L 26/1.

  9. The second recital states: ‘Whereas in order to ensure minimum equivalent protection for both shareholders and creditors of public limited liability companies, the coordination of national provisions relating to their formation and to the maintenance, increase or reduction of their capital is particularly important.’

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  22. Article 15(1)(a) states: ‘Except for cases of reductions of subscribed capital, no distribution to shareholders may be made when on the closing date of the last financial year the net assets as set out in the company’s annual accounts are, or following such a distribution would become, lower than the amount of the subscribed capital plus those reserves which may not be distributed under the law or the statutes.’

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  45. See H. Fleischer, ‘Legal Transplants in European Company Law — The Case of Fiduciary Duties’, European Company and Financial Law Review (2005) p. 378 at p. 393; see also M. Bors, ‘Recht und Autorität’, in P. Tercier, ed., Festschrift für Peter Gauch (Zürich, Schulthess 2004) p. 37 at p. 42 et seq.

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  1. University of Bonn, Germany

    Holger Fleischer (Professor of Law, Director of the Institute for Commercial and Economic Law)

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Fleischer, H. Legal Capital: A Navigation System for Corporate Law Scholarship. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 7, 29–38 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752906000292

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